

Right to life: duty to undertake effective investigation

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This article is concerned with the procedural obligation to investigate effectively the use of force which results in death under [art.2](#) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (as opposed to the substantive right to life under [art.2](#)). I therefore distinguish [art.2](#) substantive from [art.2](#) procedural.

[Article 2](#) procedural is applied to a much wider range of deaths, which is not dealt with here, save for an important Supreme Court case (below) which has a bearing on state killings and other violent deaths.

Overview of Topic

1. [Article 2\(1\)](#) of the ECHR, given further effect in domestic law through scheduling to the [Human Rights Act 1998](#) (HRA), now reads effectively (given implied amending and rules on derogation): "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law".
2. [Article 2\(2\)](#) continues to read as effectively a defence: "Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection".
3. [Article 2\(1\)](#) has vertical effect, with positive as well as negative obligations imposed upon the state vis-a-vis a person.
4. A strand of case law from the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, predominantly emanating from events which occurred during the Troubles in Northern Ireland (1968 - 1998), established a concomitant procedural obligation on public authorities to investigate effectively where the use of force results in death. Query whether it is all deaths or only state killings? Query whether Strasbourg has even given any thought to terrorist killings? The effect of Strasbourg's intervention has been a rewriting of Northern Ireland history. The 90 per cent of terrorist killings (all unlawful) has been obscured by the 10 per cent of state killings, most of which were lawful by Strasbourg standards: [Da Silva v United Kingdom \(5878/08\)](#), ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 30 March 2016 (the John Charles de Menezes case).

Prelude to legal change

5. On 11 January 2000, Strasbourg decided: *Caraher v United Kingdom* (24520/94) (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. CD119. Here, the applicant's husband had been killed by two soldiers in Co. Armagh in 1990 (they were later acquitted of his murder). She relied upon the [art.2](#) substantive right. She lost on admissibility as no longer a victim, because she had settled a civil action in Northern Ireland for £50,000.
6. While this decision did not relate directly to the procedural obligation, *Caraher* was to be relied upon by the United Kingdom subsequently, and to inspire domestic courts to limit historical investigations on the basis of remedies obtained.

The Northern Ireland art.2 procedural obligation cases

7. These may be listed by date of judgment at Strasbourg, indicating the circumstances of the deaths:
 - (1) *Jordan v United Kingdom* (24746/94) (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 2, 4 May 2001, concerning Pearse Jordan, a IRA member, who was shot by a police officer after a car chase in Belfast in November 1992;
 - (2) *McKerr v United Kingdom* (28883/95) (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 20, 4 May 2001, concerning Gervaise McKerr (driving a car with two others), all being killed as suspected terrorists by pursuing police officers in Lurgan in November 1982;
 - (3) *Kelly v United Kingdom* (30054/96) [2001] Inquest L.R. 125, the eight IRA members killed by the SAS defending Loughall police station in May 1987;
 - (4) *Shanaghan v United Kingdom* (37715/97) [2001] Inquest L.R. 149, probably a IRA member, who was killed by loyalists while driving his van near Castlederg in August 1991;
 - (5) *McShane v United Kingdom* (43290/98) [2002] 35 E.H.R.R. 23, 28 May 2002, killed by an army vehicle during a late-night riot in Londonderry on 13 July 1996;
 - (6) *Finucane v United Kingdom* (29178/95) [2003] 37 E.H.R.R. 29, 1 July 2003, the killing of catholic solicitor Patrick Finucane in Belfast in 1989 by loyalists;
 - (7) *Brecknell v United Kingdom* (32457/04) [2007] 11 WLUK 675, 27 November 2007, one of three customers killed in a loyalist attack upon a bar in Silverbridge, Co. Armagh in 1975;
 - (8) *McCaughey v United Kingdom* (43098/09) (2014) 58 E.H.R.R. 13, 16 July 2013 (a much later case), two IRA members killed at a suspected arms dump by soldiers near Loughall in 1990. This was essentially a delayed investigation case.
 - (9) *Hemsworth v United Kingdom* (58559/09), 16 July 2013, a person assaulted by police in July 1997 who died months later (in January 1998).
8. The key cases are (1) to (4), decided jointly on 4 May 2001. Strasbourg, avoiding substantive violations, fashioned a new procedural obligation. (The court did not rise to the occasion jurisprudentially on the issue of non-state actors having perpetrated the killings in cases (4), (6) and (7).) There are other cases emanating from Northern Ireland, including deaths in custody, but the above nine cases establish the procedural obligation. Strasbourg, which tried to discourage repeat cases, arguably acted counter-productively by awarding damages in each individual application (when, in the case of *McCann v United Kingdom* (A/324) (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 97, which dealt with the shooting of unarmed IRA members planning a bombing in Gibraltar in 1988, it had reasoned that a substantive violation did not warrant an award

given the intentions of the victims). Surely that applies more so to a procedural obligation, and especially the applicants in *Kelly's* case.

9. It could be argued that there is an initial legal problem with cases (1) to (4) above. Strasbourg made clear it was not making any findings of facts, about the original killings or the subsequent investigations, whether satisfactory or not. How then could it fashion a procedural obligation based upon an apparent finding of inadequacy?
10. There is a bigger legal problem with cases (1) to (4). The procedural obligation is, in the case of Northern Ireland, largely retrospective. There had been no such law during the Troubles. Subsequently, this obligation was imposed on the United Kingdom. It follows that the conduct of state agencies was to be assessed by judges using standards developed in 2001 and subsequently.

Non-UK cases developing the procedural obligation

11. It is necessary to mention two non-United Kingdom cases at Strasbourg regarding procedural [art.2](#), developing the obligation. Under [art.46\(1\)](#) of the ECHR, neither case is binding upon the UK.
12. *Silih v Slovenia* (71463/01) (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 37 is a medical negligence case, which makes the procedural obligation seemingly dependent upon a violation of the substantive right (para.194). This was ignored for some time.
13. *Janowiec v Russia* (55508/07) (2014) 58 E.H.R.R. 30 (concerning the Katyn forest killings in Poland during the second world war, by the Soviet Union and not Germany); in this case, the court came up with a three-stage test permitting retrospectivity of up to ten years - drawing upon *Silih's* case (plus *Varnava v Turkey* (16064/90) (2010) 50 E.H.R.R. 21) - namely:
 - first, "a "genuine connection" with the death as the triggering event consisting of ... a reasonably short period of time between the death as the triggering event and the entry into force of the Convention (not in excess of 10 years)";
 - second, "a requirement that the major part of the investigation must have been or ought to have been carried out after the entry into force of the Convention" or
 - third, "in extraordinary situations which did not meet the "genuine connection" test but raised a need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected, for such cases as war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity. Although the present case potentially fell within this latter category, the "Convention values" clause could not be applied to events which occurred prior to the adoption of the Convention in 1950" (headnote).
14. The killings had taken place in 1940, in Poland. In 1943, an international commission exhumed bodies, blaming the Soviet Union correctly. Russia, the successor state, accepted responsibility in 1990, and conducted a criminal investigation until 2004. No one was left alive to prosecute. Russia had ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in May 1998. According to the headnote: "The events capable of triggering an obligation to investigate took place in 1940, more than 10 years before the Convention came into existence [on 4 November 1950] and the "Convention values" standard could not be applied. The [Russian] Government's objection *ratione temporis* was upheld and the Court was not competent to examine the complaint under [art.2](#)."
15. This is truly extraordinary jurisprudence. In international law, a state is bound by what it agrees to, under the law of treaties. In *Janowiec's* case, without being any help to the applicants, Strasbourg invented a "genuine connection" test, creating international obligations 10 years before they were agreed, and also a "Conventions values" test, which started in 1950 - a date of signing not of ratification.

16. Interest has been expressed, in *Silih*, in the joint dissenting judgment of Judges Bratza and Turmen: pp 57.
17. The UK and Turkish members of the court affirmed that the ECHR was a multilateral international agreement, subject to the customary international law of treaties (as codified in the 1969 Vienna convention on the law of treaties).

Article 2 in UK law

18. The Strasbourg case law has been considered by the House of Lords/Supreme Court in the following leading cases:
 - (1) *R. (on the application of Amin (Imtiaz)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2003] UKHL 51; [2004] 1 A.C. 653, a prisoner in custody killed by another, Lord Bingham deciding on 16 October 2003 to follow Jordan's case in Strasbourg;
 - (2) *R. (on the application of Green) v Police Complaints Authority* [2004] UKHL 6; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 725, a cyclist hit by a police car, Lord Bingham deciding on 26 February 2004 to dismiss an appeal concerning disclosure of police investigation material;
 - (3) *R. (on the application of Middleton) v HM Coroner for Western Somerset* [2004] UKHL 10; [2004] 2 A.C. 182, a prisoner committing suicide, Lord Bingham deciding again on 11 March 2004 to follow Jordan's case in Strasbourg;
 - (4) *McKerr's Application for Judicial Review, Re* [2004] UKHL 12; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 807, the McKerr above in Strasbourg (who had been awarded £10,000 damages there), with Lord Nicholls deciding also on 11 March 2004 that the Human Rights Act 1998 did not apply to deaths before 2 October 2000, when it entered into force; (*R (Amin)* and *R (Middleton)*) were held in McKerr's case to have been decided per incuriam the question of retrospectivity (para 23);
 - (5) *Jordan v Lord Chancellor* [2007] UKHL 14; [2007] 2 A.C. 226 (being the Jordan and McCaughey in Strasbourg above), where Lord Bingham applied McKerr's case, the second appeal being allowed regarding police disclosure to a coroner;
 - (6) *R. (on the application of Smith) v Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner* [2010] UKSC 29; [2011] 1 A.C. 1, a British soldier dying of hyperthermia off an army base in Iraq, where Lord Phillips (with a court of nine) held on 30 June 2010 (on the assumption that human rights law applied in Iraq in this case, which it did not), that, on these assumed facts, the possibility of a substantive violation of art.2 triggered the procedural obligation;
 - (7) *McCaughey's Application for Judicial Review, Re* [2011] UKSC 20; [2012] 1 A.C. 725 (being the McCaughey in Strasbourg above again), where the Supreme Court held that, once the UK decided to hold an inquest, then the art.2 procedural obligation might apply. The domestic court arguably responded too precipitately to *Silih*'s case in Strasbourg (which was remember a medical negligence case), before the international court further considered temporal jurisdiction in Varnava's case and Janowiec's case;
 - (8) *R. (on the application of Keyu) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* [2015] UKSC 69; [2016] A.C. 1355, regarding a refusal to hold a statutory inquiry into the killing of 24 persons by the British army in Malaya in 1948, where Lord Neuberger held on 25 November 2015 that, as regards the art.2 procedural obligation, Strasbourg jurisprudence now permitted retrospectivity (if there was a continuing breach) of up to ten years, between the date of death and 1966, when the UK first permitted individual petition. Lord Neuberger, considering *McKerr's* case after *McCaughey's* case, decided to leave open whether the UK had to follow Strasbourg (para 98). Lord Kerr, however, explained his thinking: *Silih*'s case detached the procedural duty from art.2 for the first time (paras 247-9). But he left open whether *McKerr's* case should be overruled;
 - (9) In the matter of *Finucane's Application for Judicial Review, Re* [2019] UKSC 7; [2019] 2 WLUK 382, concerning the death of Geraldine Finucane's husband Patrick in 1989. The family remained critical of the

2012 report by the late Sir Desmond de Silva QC. They wanted a public inquiry. Lord Kerr (on behalf of the court) went further than Strasbourg, which had settled the case with the United Kingdom. He picked holes in the de Silva report. But he concluded with this arguably anti-climactic statement: "I would therefore make a declaration that there has not been an [article 2](#) compliant inquiry into the death of Patrick Finucane. It does not follow that a public inquiry of the type which the appellant seeks must be ordered. It is for the state to decide, in light of the incapacity of Sir Desmond de Silva's review and the inquiries which preceded it to meet the procedural requirement of [article 2](#), what form of investigation, if indeed any is now feasible, is required in order to meet that requirement. The appeal should otherwise be dismissed." (paras 153-4).

19. It remained the position that *McKerr's* case in the House of Lords in 2004, was good law as regards the [art.2](#) procedural obligation under the [Human Rights Act 1998](#) (i.e., that it did not apply to deaths which occurred before the legislation came into force). It had not been overruled, especially not in *McCaughey's* case. And *Finucane's* case had not changed that position, despite the de Silva report being found to be non [art.2](#) compliant.
20. *Smith's* case and *Keyu's* case were (originally) English and United Kingdom law respectively, and both attempt to deal with updating Strasbourg jurisprudence. The former arguably limited the right (relating procedure to substance), while the latter clearly extended retrospectivity.

The Supreme Court finally resolves the matter

21. It was difficult, with a line of authority from Strasbourg (exciting interest in Northern Ireland), and another domestic line of authority often involving the same cases. Then, in December 2021, the Supreme Court resolved matters with a case from Northern Ireland, *McQuillan*. This process continued, this time with an English case, *R. (on the application of Maguire) v HM Senior Coroner for Blackpool and Fylde* [2023] UKSC 20 in June 2023, which has an important bearing on article 2 procedural. Thirdly, in a much delayed case from Northern Ireland, *Dalton*, in October 2023, the Supreme Court made clear that the rule against retrospectivity was to have an important bearing on Northern Ireland Troubles deaths.

McQuillan (December 2021)

22. On 15 December 2021, a seven-judge Supreme Court handed down judgment in three cases, arising from two Northern Ireland appeals: *McQuillan's Application for Judicial Review, Re*; *McGuigan's Application for Judicial Review, Re*; *McKenna's application for Judicial Review, Re* [2021] UKSC 55; [2021] 12 WLUK 186.
23. This was a major opportunity to review domestic and Strasbourg jurisprudence, and their interaction. While the Supreme Court began with the coming into force of the HRA on 2 October 2000, it was arguably too deferential to Strasbourg jurisprudence: Austen Morgan, [Interpretation of Convention Rights: Human Rights Act 1998 s 2](#).
24. One of the two appeals concerned the 14 so-called 'hooded men' from 1971, where the army had taught five detainee interrogation techniques to the police. In *Ireland v United Kingdom (A/25) (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 25, [1978] 1 WLUK 793*, Strasbourg had found a violation of article 3 (but only inhuman and degrading treatment). More recently, human rights activists had found apparently incriminating material in the National Archives in London. In *Ireland v United Kingdom (2018) 67 E.H.R.R. SE1*, Strasbourg refused to reopen the case to make a finding instead of torture. The Supreme Court quashed a police decision of 2014 not to investigate alleged torture as irrational, but it did not require the police to commence a new investigation.
25. Save for this, the chief constable, the secretary of state and the department of justice in Northern Ireland succeeded in their appeals. This reversed a position which had prevailed since 2001, even if *McQuillan's* case was clearly not the last word on [art.2](#) procedural.
26. The focus on 2 October 2000 made *McQuillan's* case truly remarkable. It did suggest that the HRA superseded any access through the common law to Strasbourg law. Considering the *McKerr* line of (domestic) cases, it went straight to

s.22(4) of the HRA: "Paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 7 applies to proceedings brought by or at the instigation of a public authority whenever the action in question took place; but otherwise that subsection does not apply to an act taking place before the coming into force of that section."

27. The Supreme Court reasoned: "The general presumption is that a statute which creates rights and obligations does not have retrospective effect. This reflects values of fairness, legal certainty and the rule of law. It is desirable that people, including public officials and public authorities, should be able to determine their legal rights and obligations at the time of acting or omitting to act. It is generally unfair to treat people as subject to obligations of which they were not on notice at the time." (para.151)
28. It is all the more strange that the Supreme Court went to *Brecknell's* case in 2007, for the proposition that fresh evidence could revive an obligation to investigate, and to *Janowiec's* case in 2014, for retrospectivity before a critical date (1966 when UK residents were permitted to go to Strasbourg in the opinion of the hooded men's counsel).

R (Maguire) (June 2023)

29. *R. (on the application of Maguire) v HM Senior Coroner for Blackpool and Fylde [2023] UKSC 20* concerned an inquest into an adults with Down's syndrome, who had died in hospital in February 2017 of a number of arguably preventable or curable conditions. Lord Sales JSC gave the lead judgment. He was supported by three colleagues, but not Lord Stephens JSC (from Northern Ireland), who agreed with the dismissal of the appeal brought by the claimant's mother, but chose to give a separate judgment.
30. Lord Sales discussed the law on art.2 procedural in paras 8 to 24 generally, and this must now be considered the definitive exposition on investigations into deaths.
31. Lord Sales began with art.2 substantive. It imposed a negative obligation on the state, not to take life unlawfully. But domestic and Strasbourg case law implied two positive obligations to protect life. The first was the so-called systems duty: "an obligation to have appropriate legal regimes and administrative systems in place to provide for the lives of citizens and persons in its territory" (para 10). The second was the so-called operational duty: "an obligation to take operational steps to protect a specific person or persons when on notice that they are subject to a risk to life of a particularly clear and pressing kind" (para 10). Lord Sales went further: there was also an investigatory duty: "certain positive obligations of a procedural nature regarding investigation of and opportunity to call state authorities to account for potential breaches of the substantive obligations to which it gives rise." (para 12)
32. Two points may be made about this analysis. First, the learned justice starts from the substantive right (and does not locate art.2 procedural as a new Strasbourg right). And second, art.2 procedural is one of a series of implied positive obligations - derived from the substantive obligation - as distinct from the express negative obligation regarding the right to life.
33. The implication - graduated response - is clear from para 12: "The precise content of the procedural obligation on a state varies according to the context in which an issue regarding the application of Article 2 arises. There is no simple monolithic form of procedural obligation which applies to every such case. Rather, the procedural obligation applies in a graduated way depending on the circumstances of the case and the way in which in a particular context the state may be called upon to provide due accountability in relation to the steps taken to protect the right to life under Article 2. The graduated way in with the procedural obligation applies reflects the fact that the obligation, like the substantive positive obligations under Article 2, is an implied positive duty which is not to be taken to impose an unreasonable or disproportionate burden upon the state."
34. Lord Sales concluded with a tripartite discussion of the graduated procedural obligation. First, a basic procedural obligation, distinguishing a death from natural causes from criminal conduct. Second, an enhanced procedural obligation, where "there is a particularly compelling reason why the state should be required to give an account of how a person came by their death" (para.15). And third, the redress procedural obligation: "there is an obligation to provide

means by which a person complaining of such possible breaches may ventilate that complaint, have it investigated and obtain redress" (para 19). The learned justice placed lethal force in the second category, and medical negligence cases in the third category.

Dalton (October 2023)

35. This case was heard in the Supreme Court in October 2022, but judgment was not handed down for nearly a year: *Dalton's Application for Judicial Review, Re [2023] UKSC 36*. This suggests the justices had a great deal to sort out, between the president, Lord Reed, and - facing him - the vice-president, Lord Hodge (supported by Lord Sales), on whether the Finucane case could be sustained.
36. A seven-judge Supreme Court was appointed in Dalton (Lord Stephens could not hear the appeal from his own decision, and Dame Siobhan Keegan - the lady chief justice in Northern Ireland - joined the hearing as a non-member of the court). On 18 October 2023, the Northern Ireland attorney general's appeal was allowed by seven votes to nil.
37. The case turned factually on 31 August 1988 (the date of three deaths) being more than twelve years before the [Human Rights Act 1998](#) entered into force on 2 October 2000 (in contrast to the death of Patrick Finucane on 12 February 1989, which was less than twelve years). But it was argued legally, largely through Strasbourg jurisprudence - which may detract from the significance of the non-retrospectivity principle being applied to all Northern Ireland legacy cases. Non-retrospectivity before 2 October 2000 had the virtue of treating all troubles deaths the same. The current position - whether ten or twelve years - creates two classes of victims and relatives: those before 1988 or 1990, who are denied all legal remedies; and those from either date to 1998, who are privileged by Strasbourg as an exception to a UK statute, the [Human Rights Act 1998](#).
38. There are 104 references to *McQuillan*, which was followed by all seven justices - meaning the case is now well-established in the common law. There are 165 references to Finucane, where they disagreed profoundly. While the outcome means a unanimous decision, the reasons given varied on the question of Finucane. Lord Reed, the president, allowed the appeal in 51 paras, agreeing generally with Lord Leggatt, and Lord Burrows and Dame Siobhan Keegan. That was a group of four with three judgments. However, Lord Reed's pragmatic reasons for leaving Finucane in place were thin. Lord Leggatt gave his own judgment in a side issue in 100 paras: "I would...respect the doctrine of precedent and stand by what the Courts have decided in Finucane and McQuillan" (para 296). Three justices - Lord Hodge, the vice-president, Lord Sales and Lady Rose - allowing the appeal in 144 paras (and dealing with the facts at considerable length), went further: "this court has no jurisdiction to consider the application for judicial review under [section 7\(1\)\(b\) of the HRA](#) because the exception to the general non-retrospectivity of that Act arising from the Janowiec decision of the Strasbourg Court...mean[s] that the claim is outside the temporal scope of the HRA." (para 195). There was a hard ten-year rule, overruling in effect Lord Kerr's stretching to include Finucane. Finally, Lord Burrows and Dame Siobhan Keegan, in 51 paras, joined in allowing the appeal: "albeit...we firmly rejection the submissions of Mr McGlennan [KC], on behalf of the AGNI, that Finucane should be overruled and that the obiter dicta in McQuillan should be rejected." (para 345). The Supreme Court split, looking at the jurisprudence on Finucane, with four (including the president) maintaining the decision and three (including the vice-present) going much further.
39. The author's judgment is now that it may take another Supreme Court case, applying [s.2 of the Human Rights Act 1998](#), for domestic law to hold that the non-retrospectivity principle cannot be distorted by any temporal scope reasoning from Silih and Janowiec in the form of a putative exception. Several Northern Ireland legacy cases are on their way to the Supreme Court: it remains to be seen whether the point will be taken by a party or an intervenor.

Conclusion

40. A number of points needs to be taken by way of conclusion:
 - first, the range of deaths is very wide, from alleged medical negligence in a hospital to dealing with a historic insurgency in Northern Ireland;

- second, Strasbourg has invented retrospective obligations, and been creative about widening state obligations beyond the legal range of the convention;
- third, there remains a real problem as to whether domestic courts may access Strasbourg jurisprudence through the common law (as Lord Kerr did in *Finucane's* 2019 case), or whether the [Human Rights Act 1998](#), from parliament, supersedes that;
- fourth, there is a clear line of House of Lords/Supreme Court cases stating that [art.2](#) procedural does not apply to any deaths, including in Northern Ireland, before 2 October 2000 (even if that has been pushed back, by Strasbourg, by ten years, and, in the case of Lord Kerr on *Finucane*, by twelve years); and fifth, the domestic law principle of non-retrospectivity, initially overridden by Strasbourg in 2001, and then occupying a twilight world of domestic versus Strasbourg case law, until December 2021, is now clearly to the fore in Northern Ireland legacy cases.

Legislation

Key Acts

[Human Rights Act 1998](#)

Key Subordinate Legislation

None.

Key Quasi-Legislation

None.

Key European Union Legislation

[European Convention on Human Right](#)

Key Cases

Caraher v United Kingdom (24520/94) (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. CD119

Jordan v United Kingdom (24746/94) (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 2

McKerr v United Kingdom (28883/95) (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 20

Kelly v United Kingdom (30054/96) [2001] Inquest L.R. 125

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Finucane v United Kingdom (29178/95) (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 29

McCaughey v United Kingdom (43098/09) (2014) 58 E.H.R.R. 13

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R. (on the application of Middleton) v HM Coroner for Western Somerset [2004] UKHL 10; [2004] 2 A.C. 182

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R. (on the application of Smith) v Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner [2010] UKSC 29; [2011] 1 A.C. 1

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R. (on the application of Keyu) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69; [2016] A.C. 1355

Finucane's Application for Judicial Review, Re [2019] UKSC 7; [2019] 2 W.L.U.K. 382

Judicial Review, Re [2021] UKSC 55; [2021] W.L.U.K. 186

In the Matter of an Application by Patricia Burns for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review [2022] NIQB 18

In the Matter of an Application by John McEvoy for Judicial Review [2022] NIKB 20

R. (on the application of Maguire) v HM Senior Coroner for Blackpool and Fylde [2023] UKSC 20

Dalton's Application for Judicial Review, Re [2023] UKSC 36

Reading

Key Texts

None.

Further Reading

None.